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The Great Lakes have long been a jealously guarded resource.  
Large-scale diversions of Great Lakes water drew passionate 
responses in the region as early as 1900, when Illinois reversed the 
Chicago River, withdrawing 5.4 billion gallons a day of Lake 
Michigan water and prompting a multistate lawsuit.1  In 1998, a 
proposal by an Ontario-based company to ship tankers of Lake 
Superior water to distribute in Asia induced the Great Lakes states to 
begin negotiations on an interstate compact to strengthen regional 
Great Lakes management.2  The resulting Great Lakes–St. Lawrence 
River Basin Water Resources Compact3 (Compact or the Great Lakes 
Compact), signed into law in October of 2008, produced the most 
ambitious and comprehensive effort of the Great Lakes states to 
protect and manage the world’s largest freshwater resource.4 
Calling for cooperative management of the Great Lakes aquatic 
ecosystem among all eight states that border the lakes,5 the Compact 
focuses on conserving the Great Lakes ecosystem “in the common 
 
1 Wisconsin v. Illinois, 278 U.S. 367, 403 (1929) (discussing the facts found by the 
Supreme Court appointed special master). Wisconsin, Michigan, Minnesota, Ohio, 
Pennsylvania, and New York all sued to enjoin the diversion.  Id. at 399.  Missouri, 
Kentucky, Tennessee, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Arkansas joined Illinois as intervening 
defendants.  Id. at 400–01.  The suit resulted in a consent decree limiting Chicago’s 
withdrawal to 3200 cubic feet of water per second, Wisconsin v. Illinois, 388 U.S. 426 
(1967), amended by Wisconsin v. Illinois, 449 U.S. 48 (1980), less than a quarter of its 
engineered capacity of 14,000 cubic feet per second.  C. ARCH WILLIAMS, THE SANITARY 
DISTRICT OF CHICAGO: HISTORY OF ITS GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT AS SHOWN BY 
DECISIONS OF THE COURTS AND WORK OF ITS LAW DEPARTMENT 196 (1919). 
2 Morning Edition: States Approve Compact to Protect Great Lakes (Nat’l Pub. Radio 
broadcast July 8, 2008), available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php 
?storyId=92297955.  For a report on current diversions of basin water, see UNIVERSITY OF 
WISCONSIN, MILWAUKEE & GREAT LAKES WATER INSTITUTE, OUR WATERS: 
DIVERSIONS OF GREAT LAKES WATER 4 (2008), available at http://www.glwi.uwm.edu/ 
ourwaters/documents/DiversionsCWeb.pdf. 
3 Great Lakes–St. Lawrence River Basin Compact, Pub. L. No. 110-342, 122 Stat. 3739 
(2008) [hereinafter Compact] (expressing the consent and approval of Congress to an 
interstate compact regarding water resources in the Great Lakes–St. Lawrence River 
Basin). 
4 See Noah D. Hall, Toward a New Horizontal Federalism: Interstate Water 
Management in the Great Lakes Region, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 405, 414–35 (2006) 
(providing a comprehensive review of the history of agreements and compacts between the 
Great Lakes states). 
5 Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and 
Wisconsin are the eight states that border the Great Lakes, and are parties to the Compact. 
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interests of the people of the region,”6 largely by regulating 
“diversions”7 of water from a Great Lake watershed and high-volume 
“withdrawals”8 for water use within the originating watershed.  This 
Comment uses “diversions and withdrawals” to refer to Compact-
governed uses of Great Lakes water, although the volume of 
Compact-governed withdrawals may vary by state.9  The Compact 
bans all new or increased diversions,10 with three exceptions, 
including intrabasin transfers between Great Lakes watersheds,11 and 
it requires state approval consistent with Compact provisions for all 
new or increased withdrawals.12 
The Compact adopted a public trust doctrine in Great Lakes Basin 
waters that party states cannot ignore,13 proclaiming that “the [w]aters 
of the [b]asin are precious public natural resources shared and held in 
trust by the [s]tates,”14 and defining “waters of the basin” to include 
the Great Lakes themselves, all connecting water bodies, and tributary 
groundwater.15  Further, the Compact recognized a duty in all of the 
 
6 Compact, supra note 3, § 3.1.  See also id. § 1.3(2)(a)–(h) (stating the purposes of the 
Compact, including the parties’ duty to protect and conserve the basin waters for future 
generations). 
7 Id. § 1.2 (“Diversion means a transfer of [w]ater from the [b]asin into another 
watershed, or from the watershed of one of the Great Lakes into that of another by any 
means of transfer . . . but does not apply to [w]ater that is used in the [b]asin or a Great 
Lake watershed to manufacture or produce a Product that is then transferred out of the 
[b]asin or watershed.”). 
8 Id. (“Withdrawal means the taking of water from surface water or groundwater.”). 
9 Id. § 4.10 (requiring each state to set a threshold level for regulation of withdrawals). 
10 Id. § 4.8. 
11 Id. § 4.9 (exempting diversions to communities that lie partially within the basin, 
diversions to counties that lie partially outside the basin, and transfers of water between 
Great Lakes watersheds).  See infra text accompanying notes 63–65 (discussing the three 
exceptions). 
12 Id. § 4.10(1) (requiring each state to ensure that “[w]ithdrawals overall will not result 
in significant impacts to the [w]aters and [w]ater [d]ependent [n]atural [r]esources of the 
[b]asin . . . and that all other objectives of the Compact are achieved”).  Section 4.11 
contains the “decision-making standard,” which includes specific criteria that all regulated 
withdrawals must satisfy before state approval.  Id. § 4.11. 
13 Id. § 9.3 (“Each provision of this Compact is considered material to the entire 
Compact, and failure to implement or adhere to any provision may be considered a 
material breach.”). 
14 Id. § 1.3(1)(a). 
15 Id. § 1.2.  The term “tributary groundwater” can be interpreted to mean all 
groundwater within the boundaries of the Great Lakes Basin as drawn on the surface.  Id. § 
4.12(5).  Cf. Memorandum from Douglas Cherkauer and Timothy Grundl, Professors of 
Geosciences, Univ. of Wisconsin–Milwaukee, to Members of the Special Comm. on Great 
Lakes Water Res. Compact (Dec. 4, 2006) (discussing the use and definition of the term  
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states to manage and protect “the renewable but finite [w]aters of the 
[b]asin for the use, benefit and enjoyment of all their citizens, 
including generations yet to come.”16  These provisions burden the 
Compact states with trustee obligations in their management of the 
Great Lakes Basin waters.17 
The Compact aside, all of the signatory states are trustees under the 
public trust doctrine, which requires the states to hold navigable 
waters in trust for the public.18  All of the Compact states recognize 
the public trust doctrine, which passed to the American colonies and 
states through the reception of English common law,19 and this 
doctrine appears in their common law, statutes, or constitutions.20  
Due to their particular common law, statutes, and constitutions, states 
have different conceptions of which waters qualify as navigable for 
trust purposes.21  Until the Compact, no state identified groundwater 
as a trust resource.22  In fact, all Compact states exclude non-
navigable surface water from the trust.23 
In addition to adopting a Compact public trust for all Great Lakes 
Basin waters, the Compact preserved the states’ common laws 
regarding water rights, asserting that nothing in the Compact “shall be 
 
tributary groundwater), available at http://legis.state.wi.us/lc/committees/study/2006/ 
GLAKE/files/sugcherkauer3.pdf. 
16 Compact, supra note 3, § 1.3(1)(f). 
17 Id. 
18 See, e.g., Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 453 (1892) (“The state can no 
more abdicate its trust over property in which the whole people are interested, like 
navigable waters and the soils under them . . . than it can abdicate its police powers in the 
administration of government and the preservation of the peace.”).  See also Crystal S. 
Chase, The Illinois Central Public Trust Doctrine and Federal Common Law: An 
Unconventional View, 14 HASTINGS W.-NW. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y (forthcoming 2009) 
(discussing the applicability of a federal public trust doctrine to all states). 
19 See, e.g., Glass v. Goeckel, 703 N.W.2d 58, 64–66 (Mich. 2005) (describing the 
history of the public trust doctrine). 
20 See Robin Kundis Craig, A Comparative Guide to the Eastern Public Trust 
Doctrines: Classifications of States, Property Rights, and State Summaries, 16 PENN ST. 
ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (2007) (summarizing the current public trust doctrines in states east of 
the Mississippi River, including all of the Compact party states). 
21 Id. at 44–50, 68–73, 83–87, 90–94, 110–13 (summarizing the Compact states’ public 
trust doctrines). 
22 Bertram C. Frey & Andrew Mutz, The Public Trust in Surface Waterways and 
Submerged Lands of the Great Lakes States, 40 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 907, 910 (2007) 
(“In general, public trust waters are the ‘navigable waters’ of the state, and public trust 
lands comprise the lands beneath these waters.”) (citing Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 26 
(1894); Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 146 U.S. at 460)). 
23 See Craig, supra note 20, at 44–50, 68–73, 83–87, 90–94, 110–13. 
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construed as affecting or intending to affect or in any way to interfere 
with the law of the respective [p]arties relating to common law 
[w]ater rights.”24  However, the Compact’s trust provision expressly 
reaches diversions and withdrawals of non-navigable surface water 
and groundwater, previously excluded from the Compact states’ 
public trust doctrines.  State courts will have to reconcile this apparent 
conflict between the Compact’s public trust doctrine and the 
Compact’s express preservation of common law. 
Michigan and Wisconsin are two of the most important states for 
comparative analysis of the public trust doctrine and Compact 
implementation because the Compact will have the greatest effect in 
these two states.  Each state has more miles of Great Lakes shoreline 
than any other state,25 as well as the highest consumption rates of 
basin water in the region.26  Also, one-third of Wisconsin is within the 
basin, and the state’s fastest growing communities lie partially outside 
of the basin,27 making the areas with the fastest growing water 
demands potentially eligible to divert basin water under the 
exceptions to the Compact’s diversion prohibition.28  Michigan is the 
only state located entirely within the basin,29 so while it will have veto 
 
24 Compact, supra note 3, § 8.1(2). 
25 U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Total Miles of Great Lakes Shoreline in the Nation, in 
NATIONAL WATER QUALITY INVENTORY: 1998 REPORT TO CONGRESS app. F, app. F 
(1998), available at http://www.epa.gov/305b/98report/appendf.pdf.  Michigan has 3250 
miles of Great Lakes shoreline, Wisconsin has 1017 miles, and New York has the third 
longest Great Lakes shoreline with 577 miles.  Id. 
26 THE NORTHEAST-MIDWEST COALITION GREAT LAKES TASK FORCE, MEETING 
NOTES: WATER DIVERSIONS WORKSHOP 2 (1999), available at http://www.nemw.org/ 
images/stories/documents/waterdivert.pdf.  Behind only Ontario, which consumes 29% of 
the total basin use, Michigan and Wisconsin consume 22 and 21%, respectively.  Id.  
Indiana uses 7%; New York, Quebec, and Ohio each use 6%; Minnesota uses 2%; and 
Pennsylvania and Illinois use less than 1% each.  Id. 
27 GREAT LAKES WATER RES. COMPACT COMM., STATUS REPORT OF THE SPECIAL 
COMMITTEE ON GREAT LAKES WATER RESOURCES COMPACT 4 (2007), available at 
http://www.legis.state.wi.us/lc/committees/study/2006/GLAKE/files/status report.pdf. 
28 Compact, supra note 3, § 4.9(1), (3) (exempting “straddling communities” and 
“straddling counties”). 
29 GREAT LAKES WATER RES. COMPACT COMM., supra note 27, at 4.  About 32% of 
Wisconsin is within the basin, compared to 7% of Minnesota, 0.2% of Illinois, and 3% of 
Indiana.  Id.  Ohio lies 29% within the basin.  Id.  New York lies 40% within the basin.  
DEPT. OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION, N.Y. STATE, GREAT LAKES, http://www.dec.ny.gov/ 
lands/25562.html (last visited Jan. 20, 2010). 
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power over some diversions in other states,30 it will never be subject 
to such a veto itself.31  Thus, although Wisconsin’s geography will 
likely require Compact interpretation and application earlier in that 
state than in many others,32  Michigan will have a powerful voice in 
determining the outcome of Wisconsin’s decision-making process. 
Michigan and Wisconsin also have some of the richest law in the 
region concerning the public trust doctrine.  Both states recognize the 
doctrine as inherent in their sovereignty,33 and both continue to 
develop the doctrine through court decisions and statutes.34  The 
effect of the Compact’s public trust doctrine is especially pertinent in 
states with such highly developed traditional public trust doctrines. 
Hurdles to the application of the Compact’s public trust doctrine 
exist in both states.  The Wisconsin legislation implementing the 
Compact attempted to freeze the scope of that state’s traditional 
public trust doctrine, asserting that nothing in the Compact “may be 
interpreted to change the application of the public trust doctrine [in 
the Wisconsin Constitution] or to create any new public trust 
rights.”35  This statute directly conflicts with the Compact’s version of 
public trust, which includes a broader range of water bodies than 
Wisconsin’s public trust doctrine.36  In Michigan, the Compact’s 
public trust doctrine faces judicial, rather than legislative, barriers as 
 
30 Compact, supra note 3, § 4.9(3)(g) (requiring unanimous approval by the Compact 
states for diversions to communities outside the basin that are located in counties partially 
within the basin). 
31 But see Compact, supra note 3, §§ 4.10, 4.9(2) (requiring state permits in accordance 
with the Compact for new or increased withdrawals and for intrabasin transfers). 
32 Melissa Kwaterski Scanlan et al., Realizing the Promise of the Great Lakes Compact: 
A Policy Analysis for State Implementation, 8 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 39, 85–88 (2006) 
(discussing the city of Waukesha, Wisconsin, as a likely first applicant for a diversion to 
meet its drinking water needs). 
33 In re Crawford County Levee & Drainage Dist. No. 1, 196 N.W. 874, 876 (Wis. 
1924) (“From our acceptance of the provisions referred to of the Ordinance of 1787, it 
follows that it is not a question of state policy as to whether or not we shall preserve 
inviolate our navigable waters.  We are by organic law compelled so to do.”); Nedtweg v. 
Wallace, 208 N.W. 51, 52 (Mich. 1926) (describing the public trust as “an inalienable 
obligation of sovereignty”). 
34 See Craig, supra note 20, at 68–71, 110–13 (listing statutes and summarizing case 
law in Michigan and Wisconsin). 
35 WIS. STAT. § 281.343 (2008). 
36 Wisconsin’s public trust doctrine includes only navigable surface waters.  Muench v. 
Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 53 N.W.2d 514, 519 (Wis. 1952) (defining navigable waters as 
“capable of floating any boat, skiff, or canoe, of the shallowest draft used for recreational 
purposes”). 
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the state courts are reluctant to expand the scope of the public trust 
doctrine, even as public needs and values in trust resources change 
over time.  But state limits on the public trust doctrine cannot frustrate 
state implementation of the Compact’s express provisions, which 
include a public trust in diversions and withdrawals of non-navigable 
surface waters and groundwater.37 
This Comment argues that the Compact adopted a public trust in 
Great Lakes Basin waters that is distinct from the traditional public 
trust doctrines in the Compact states.  Because of the Compact’s 
strong trust language,38 it seems clear that the public trust doctrine 
applies to all state decisions governed by the Compact.  If the 
traditional state public trust doctrines contain limits that are 
inconsistent with the Compact’s public trust doctrine, this Comment 
maintains that those limits cannot frustrate implementation of the 
Compact’s public trust doctrine to Compact-regulated diversions and 
withdrawals of basin waters.  Thus, courts should differentiate the 
Compact-created trust doctrine from state common law public trust 
doctrines. 
Part I of this Comment examines the Compact and its effect in 
Michigan and Wisconsin.  Part II provides background on the public 
trust doctrine and its evolution in Michigan and Wisconsin, including 
its scope, the obligations of the states as trustees, and the availability 
of citizen standing to enforce the trust.  Part III explains how the 
Compact’s public trust is distinct from the states’ traditional public 
trust doctrines.  The Comment concludes that judicial recognition of a 
distinct Compact trust, defined by the scope and purpose of the 
Compact itself, will best reconcile the Compact’s purposes with 
traditional state public trust doctrines. 
I 
THE GREAT LAKES COMPACT 
The Great Lakes Compact was the culmination of nearly eight 
years of collaboration between the governors of the eight Great Lakes 
 
37 See supra notes 13–16 and accompanying text. 
38 Compact, supra note 3, § 1.3(1)(a) (“Waters of the [b]asin are precious public natural 
resources shared and held in trust by the [s]tates”); id. § 1.2 (defining “waters of the basin” 
and “basin water” to include surface and groundwater). 
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states.39  After each state passed ratifying legislation throughout 2007 
and 2008, and President Bush signed the requisite federal approval on 
October 3, 2008, the Compact became law.40 
One of the listed purposes of the Great Lakes Compact is to 
provide a structure for cooperative regional management to protect 
and preserve the Great Lakes Basin ecosystem for use by future 
generations in the region.41  The Compact seeks to prevent 
withdrawals from having “significant adverse impacts” on the basin’s 
ecosystem and watershed.42  Significantly, the Compact declares that 
all basin waters, including groundwater, are held in trust by the 
states43 and requires the parties to protect and manage those waters for 
the benefit and use of all their citizens.44  Thus, the Compact 
recognizes a public trust in all the interconnected waters of the Great 
Lakes Basin.45 
The Compact states did not include the public trust doctrine in the 
Compact without debate,46 and courts must give full effect to states’ 
 
39 Press Release, Council of Great Lakes Governors, President Bush Signs Great Lakes 
Compact (Oct. 3, 2008), available at http://www.cglg.org/projects/water/docs/Press 
ReleasePresidentSignsCompact10-3-08.pdf. 
40 Id. 
41 Compact, supra note 3, § 1.3(2)(a).  See also A Resolution Consenting to and 
Approving the Great Lakes–St. Lawrence River Basin Water Resources Compact: Hearing 
on S.J. Res. 45 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 3 (2008) (statement of 
Sen. Herb Kohl, Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary) (“Something that important [as the 
Great Lakes] to our prosperity needs to be conserved so that future generations can benefit, 
and the compact before us, indeed, does that.”). 
42 Compact, supra note 3, § 1.3(2)(f). 
43 Id. § 1.3(1)(a) (stating that the “[w]aters of the [b]asin are precious public natural 
resources shared and held in trust by the [s]tates”); id. § 1.2 (defining “[w]aters of the 
[b]asin” and “[b]asin [w]ater” to include surface and groundwater). 
44 Id. § 1.3(1)(f) (“The [p]arties have a shared duty to protect . . . and manage the . . . 
[w]aters of the [b]asin for the use, benefit and enjoyment of all their citizens, including 
generations yet to come.”). 
45 Id. § 1.2 (defining “water” as surface water and groundwater, and “basin water” as 
“the Great Lakes and all streams, rivers, lakes, connecting channels and other bodies of 
water, including tributary groundwater, within the [b]asin”).  The Compact then states that 
basin waters are held in trust, id. § 1.3(1)(a), indicating a clear intention to include all of 
the basin waters. 
46 See, e.g., Letter from Bart Stupak, U.S. Congressman, Mich., to John Conyers, 
Chairman, House Judiciary Comm. (Sept. 5, 2008), available at http://www.house.gov/ 
list/speech/mi01_stupak/20080905glcompact.html (requesting strengthened public trust 
language in the House Bill ratifying the Compact); MARY C. ERICSON, UNDERSTANDING 
THE GREAT LAKES COMPACT 2 (2007), available at http://www.theoec.org/PDFs/water/ 
GLC_NWFShortVer.pdf (clarifying common myths regarding the Compact’s effect on 
private water rights); Dana M. Saeger, Comment, The Great Lakes–St. Lawrence River  
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decision to pass the Compact with its public trust assertion.  Some 
commentators have suggested that the Compact’s trust language 
merely acknowledged existing law,47 without changing water rights 
because of the Compact’s express preservation of state common 
law.48  Such attempts to neutralize the Compact’s trust provision 
ignore its drafters’ use of the defined term, “waters of the basin,”49 
when they could have used the traditional term, “navigable waters.”50  
Michigan and Wisconsin politicians raised concerns regarding the 
effect of the trust provision before the Compact was passed, but no 
changes were made.51  The Senate Hearings before federal passage of 
the Compact are replete with proclamations about the importance of 
protecting the Great Lakes for future generations,52 including a 
statement from two former Michigan governors that “[w]ithout 
protecting the public trust in our waters, Michigan’s sovereign power 
to safeguard our vital interests against outside forces will be 
 
Basin Water Resources Compact: Groundwater, Fifth Amendment Takings, and the Public 
Trust Doctrine, 12 GREAT PLAINS NAT. RESOURCES J. 114, 118–19 (2007) (discussing 
“outspoken opposition” to the Compact by Ohio State Senator Tim Grendell regarding the 
Compact’s “flat-out un-American” public trust doctrine); Letter from Mary Lazich, Wis. 
State Sen., to Patricia Birkholz, Mich. State Sen., & Great Lakes Legislators (Aug. 24, 
2007), available at http://www.legis.state.wi.us/lc/committees/study/2006/GLAKE/files/ 
sept04lazich_memo.pdf (expressing concern over the effect of the Compact’s trust 
language). 
47 ERICSON, supra note 46, at 5 (“The reality is that the Compact’s reference to the 
States’ public trust obligations is simply an acknowledgement of existing law and does not 
have the effect of changing that law; the Compact expressly states its intent not to change 
existing rights by stating that the Compact shall not be construed to affect any validly 
established rights related to water withdrawals or common law water rights.”) (emphasis 
omitted). 
48 Id. 
49 Compact, supra note 3, §§ 1.2 (defining “waters of the basin”), 1.3(1)(a) (declaring 
the public trust in “the waters of the basin”). 
50 See infra notes 112–15 and accompanying text (explaining that each state holds 
“navigable waters” in trust for the public, but may define “navigable” differently). 
51 Lazich, supra note 46 (“Adopting the Compact raises the specter of extending the 
[p]ublic [t]rust [d]octrine to all waters in all Great Lakes states, including groundwater. . . .  
The [p]ublic [t]rust [d]octrine has various meanings in the states, and the Compact may 
affect each state differently.  What will it mean in [s]tate and [f]ederal courts, how will this 
get resolved?”); see also Stupak, supra note 46. 
52 A Resolution Consenting to and Approving the Great Lakes–St. Lawrence River 
Basin Water Resources Compact, supra note 41, at 2, 4, 10, 20, 27, 29, 38, 80 (statements 
of Sen. Herb Kohl, Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary; Sen. George V. Voinovich, Ohio; 
George Heartwell, Mayor, Grand Rapids, Michigan; Sen. Patricia Birkholz, Michigan; 
Att’y Gen. Mike Cox, Michigan; Cameron Davis, President and Chief Executive Officer, 
Alliance for the Great Lakes; Governor Jim Doyle, Wisconsin; Sen. Carl Levin, 
Michigan). 
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diminished.”53  Thus, the Compact’s trust provision was not a casual 
oversight, and it served a stated purpose of the Compact to protect 
reasonable state uses against outside interests.54 
The Compact prohibits all new or increased diversions of Great 
Lakes water from originating watersheds.55  There are three major 
exceptions to this prohibition,56 discussed below, all of which require 
state approval.57  The Compact also requires state approval for new or 
increased withdrawals of water for in-basin use.58  Each state must set 
a triggering volume for Compact regulation of withdrawals.59  
Further, each state must create a permitting scheme controlling 
proposed diversions and withdrawals in accordance with the 
Compact’s “exception standard” for diversions and its “decision-
making standard” for withdrawals.60  No state may approve a 
diversion or withdrawal that is inconsistent with the Compact or its 
standards,61 but the states are free to apply more stringent criteria than 
the Compact’s standards.62 
The three major exceptions to the Compact’s ban on diversions are: 
(1) transfers to areas within “straddling communities” that are outside 
of the basin,63 (2) diversions to communities located within 
“straddling counties” that lie in other watersheds,64 and (3) “intra-
 
53 Id. at 98 (submission of William G. Millikan and James J. Blanchard, former 
Governors of Michigan). 
54 Id.  By contrast, the federal legislative history of the Compact contained no 
discussion of the Compact’s Article 8 preservation of state common law water rights. 
55 Compact, supra note 3, §4.8 (“All [n]ew or [i]ncreased [d]iversions are prohibited, 
except as provided for in this [a]rticle.”) Diversion is defined by the Compact as “a 
transfer of [w]ater from the [b]asin into another watershed, or from the watershed of one 
of the Great Lakes into that of another by any means of transfer.”  Id. § 1.2. 
56 Id. § 4.9(1)–(3).  There are two other exceptions.  The definition of “[d]iversion” 
excludes water used in the basin “to manufacture or produce a [p]roduct that is then 
transferred out of the [b]asin or watershed.”  Id. § 1.2.  Also, states have discretion to 
govern water diverted in containers of 5.7 gallons or less.  Id. § 4.12(10). 
57 Id. § 4.4. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. § 4.10. 
60 Id. §§ 4.3(3), 4.10(1) (requiring states to permit diversions and withdrawals 
according to the Compact standards).  See also id. § 4.9(4) (the exception standard); id. § 
4.11 (the decision-making standard). 
61 Id. § 4.3(3). 
62 Id. § 4.12(1). 
63 Id. § 4.9(1). 
64 Id. § 4.9(3). 
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basin transfers” between Great Lakes watersheds.65  The state in 
which a proposed diversion originates must employ criteria at least as 
strict as the Compact’s exception standard.66  Similarly, each state 
must approve any new or increased withdrawals over the state-set 
threshold, according to criteria that are at least as strict as the 
Compact’s decision-making standard.67 
The exception standard and the withdrawal decision-making 
standard contain similar criteria.  Both require that all water diverted 
or withdrawn be returned to its source watershed, with an allowance 
for consumptive use.68  Also, both require that all proposed diversions 
and withdrawals have no significant adverse impacts, individually or 
cumulatively, on the basin waters or the land and living organisms 
affected by the waters.69  As explained above,70 the Compact does not 
preempt the states from strengthening the Compact’s standards.71 
 
65 Id. § 4.9(2). 
66 Id. § 4.9(1)–(4).  Diversions to “straddling communities” and intrabasin transfers 
trigger the exception standard requirements when the proposed withdrawal is at least one 
hundred thousand gallons per day.  Id. § 4.9(1)–(2).  Diversions to communities within 
“straddling counties” must always meet the exception standard.  Id. § 4.9(3)(b).  
“Straddling county” diversions and intrabasin transfers with a net water loss over five 
million gallons per day require unanimous approval by the “council” of the eight party 
state governors before the originating state may issue a permit.  Id. § 4.9(2)(c)(iv), (3)(g).  
Council approval occurs after “regional review,” which requires the originating state to 
review the proposed application and provide the regional decision-making body, which 
includes Ontario and Quebec, with a “technical review.”  Id. § 4.5(4).  The regional body 
then must allow for a public commenting period, id. § 4.5(3), before making a “declaration 
of finding” of whether the proposal meets the applicable compact standard, id. § 4.5(5).  
The Compact requires that “the protection of the integrity” of the basin ecosystem “shall 
be the overarching principle” of this regional review process.  Id. § 4.5(1)(d).  Finally, the 
council must consider the regional body’s findings before deciding whether to grant its 
approval of a proposal, which must be unanimous.  Id. § 4.9(2)(c)(iv).  Because the 
Compact trust, see discussion infra Part III, burdens each state distinctly from the varying 
traditional public trust doctrines across the region, this council approval process would be 
subject to the Compact trust.  Further, the Compact’s standing provisions extend to any 
person “aggrieved” by council action, authorizing federal judicial review after a hearing 
before the council.  Id. § 7.3(1).  Consequently, the implications of the Compact trust 
discussed throughout this paper are region wide. 
67 Id. § 4.11. 
68 Id. §§ 4.9(4)(c) (requiring that no water from outside the basin can be used to satisfy 
this basin return requirement unless it is combined with basin water and treated to satisfy 
“water quality discharge standards and to prevent the introduction of invasive species into 
the [b]asin”), 4.11(1). 
69 Id. §§ 4.9(4)(d), 4.11(2). 
70 See supra text accompanying notes 61–62. 
71 Compact, supra note 3, § 4.12(1). 
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The Compact also contains a citizen suit provision entitling any 
person “aggrieved by a Party action” to a state administrative 
hearing.72  After an aggrieved person exhausts her administrative 
remedies, the Compact authorizes judicial review of the state’s 
actions.73  Thus, under state standing law, any “aggrieved” person 
may enforce faithful state application of the Compact’s standards.74 
The provisions in the Great Lakes Compact are binding on all 
Compact states.75  Implementing legislation in each state76 specifies 
how the state will manage Compact permitting and explicitly 
mentions any state changes that strengthen the Compact permitting 
standards.77 
A.  Michigan’s Great Lakes Compact Legislation 
As the only state entirely within the Great Lakes Basin,78 Michigan 
does not have any communities or counties that lie outside of the 
basin, and thus the only diversion exception relevant in the state is the 
intrabasin transfer provision.79  Michigan’s implementing legislation 
references the Compact’s approval standards for intrabasin transfers, 
adopting them without variation.80  For regulating new or increased 
 
72 Id. § 7.3(1). 
73 Id. 
74 See infra text accompanying notes 147–52 (discussing Michigan’s standing laws); 
see also infra notes 197–210 and accompanying text (discussing Wisconsin’s standing 
laws). 
75 Compact, supra note 3, § 9.3 (“Each provision of this Compact is considered 
material to the entire Compact, and failure to implement or adhere to any provision may be 
considered a material breach.”). 
76 COUNCIL OF GREAT LAKES GOVERNORS, PROJECTS: GREAT LAKES–ST. LAWRENCE 
RIVER BASIN WATER RESOURCES COMPACT IMPLEMENTATION, http://www.cglg.org/ 
projects/water/CompactImplementation.asp#State%20Legislative%20Activity (last visited 
Dec. 30, 2009). 
77 Michigan implemented the compact through amendments to the Natural Resources 
and Environmental Protection Act of July 9, 2008, No. 180, 2008 Mich. Pub. Acts 94 
(codified at MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 324.32702, 324.32703, 324.32705, 324.32706, 
324.32723 (2008)).  This Comment refers to those amendments jointly as the Compact-
implementing statute or legislation.  In Wisconsin, the compact can be found at WIS. 
STAT. § 281.343 (2008).  The implementing legislation in Wisconsin appears at WIS. 
STAT. §§ 281.344–.346. 
78 GREAT LAKES WATER RESOURCES COMPACT COMMITTEE, supra note 27, at 4. 
79 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 324.32703 (“[A] diversion of the waters of the state out of the 
Great Lakes basin is prohibited.”). 
80 Id. § 324.32723(7) (“The department shall issue a water withdrawal permit under 
subsection (1)(d) [applying to intra-basin transfers over 100,000 gpd] if the transfer 
complies with section 4.9 of the [C]ompact.”). 
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withdrawals under the Compact, Michigan set its threshold amount at 
two million gallons per day.81  Thus, a withdrawal of this amount or 
more requires a permit from the Michigan Department of 
Environmental Quality (department or MDEQ).82  MDEQ must grant 
the permit if it determines that the proposed withdrawal satisfies the 
decision-making standard, containing the minimum criteria for 
approving in-basin withdrawals in all Compact states.83 
Michigan changed two of the Compact’s decision-making criteria.  
First, the state replaced the Compact’s six-factor reasonableness test84 
with a requirement that the department ensure the proposed use is 
reasonable under state “common law principles of water law.”85  But 
because no state may approve a withdrawal that is inconsistent with 
the Compact’s standards,86 this reference to state water law cannot 
conflict with the Compact’s reasonableness criteria in any case-by-
case balancing.87 
The second change Michigan made to the Compact’s decision-
making standard similarly references state common law.  Before 
issuing a permit the department must ensure the proposed withdrawal 
does “not violate public or private rights and limitations imposed by 
Michigan water law or other Michigan common law duties.”88  The 
Michigan statute supplied no hint as to how the department should 
 
81 Id. § 324.32723(1).  Withdrawals from high quality waters, as determined by a site-
specific review during the application process, must be approved subject to the compact-
implementing standards at 1,000,000 gpd.  Id.  Below these threshold levels, the state 
requires registration with MDEQ by any person who intends to develop the capacity to 
withdrawal an average of 100,000 gpd over any thirty-day period or to increase their 
withdraw capacity by that amount.  See also id. § 324.32705(1) (requiring registration for 
new or increased “large quantity withdrawals”); id. § 324.32701(aa) (defining “large 
quantity withdrawal”). 
82 Id. § 324.32723(1). 
83 Compact, supra note 3, § 4.12(1) (“This [s]tandard . . . shall be used as a minimum 
standard.”). 
84 Id. § 4.11(5). 
85 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 324.32723(6)(d).  See also Jacqueline P. Hand, Michigan, in 6 
WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS 681, 681–87 (Robert E. Beck ed., 2005) (providing an 
overview of Michigan’s water laws). 
86 Compact, supra note 3, § 4.11 (requiring withdrawals be approved only “when the 
following criteria are met”). 
87 Michigan’s compact implementing legislation acknowledges this requirement for 
consistency.  MICH. COMP. LAWS § 324.32723(9) (“A proposed use for which a water 
withdrawal permit is issued under this section shall be considered to satisfy the 
requirements of . . . the [C]ompact.”). 
88 Id. § 324.32723(6)(f). 
 468 J. ENVTL. LAW AND LITIGATION [Vol. 24, 455 
interpret these requirements.  Common law duties in Michigan clearly 
include trustee obligations under the public trust doctrine.89  In fact, 
the Michigan courts see themselves as trustees under the doctrine, 
along with the legislative and executive branches of the state 
government.90  Consequently, Michigan’s legislation requires that 
decisions on withdrawals comply with trustee obligations under the 
public trust doctrine. 
In the Compact, Michigan recognized a public trust doctrine that 
includes basin waters regardless of navigability, including tributary 
groundwater.91  However, the public trust doctrine in Michigan only 
includes “navigable” waters,92 which state courts have defined to 
exclude groundwater and many inland lakes and streams.93  The 
Compact recognizes common law water rights,94 but limits on 
Michigan’s public trust doctrine cannot prevent implementation of the 
Compact public trust.  State courts will have to determine the scope of 
the trustee obligations under the Compact’s public trust doctrine in 
light of the Compact’s preservation of common law.95 
B.  Wisconsin’s Great Lakes Compact Legislation 
Wisconsin passed extensive legislation implementing the Compact 
in April 2008.96  Like Michigan’s delegation of permitting authority 
to MDEQ, Wisconsin required the Wisconsin Department of Natural 
Resources (department or WDNR) to control new or increased 
diversions and withdrawals from Great Lakes waters through a permit 
system.97  By listing what the department must include in a permit98 
 
89 Obrecht v. Nat’l Gypsum Co., 105 N.W.2d 143, 149 (Mich. 1960) (reiterating 
Michigan’s commitment to the “universally accepted rules of such trusteeship”). 
90 Id. (“This Court, equally with the legislative and executive departments, is one of the 
sworn guardians of Michigan’s duty and responsibility as trustee of the above delineated 
beds of five Great Lakes.”). 
91 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 324.34201 (ratifying the Compact); Compact, supra note 3, § 
1.3(1)(a). 
92 Bott v. Comm’n of Natural Res. of Mich., 327 N.W.2d 838, 846 (Mich. 1982). 
93 Id. at 841 (“[T]he public has no right to use waters not accessible by ship or wide or 
deep enough for log flotation . . . .”). 
94 Compact, supra note 3, § 8.1(2). 
95 See infra notes 233–45 and accompanying text (discussing the relationship between 
the compact trust and state law). 
96 2007 Wis. Act 227 (2008) (codified as amended in scattered sections of Wis. Stat.), 
available at http://www.legis.state.wi.us/2007/ data/acts/07Act227.pdf. 
97 WIS. STAT. § 281.346(4) (2008) (prohibiting diversions except as authorized by 
department approval). 
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and specifically calling for department rulemaking to implement the 
permitting process, Wisconsin’s legislation provides WDNR with 
more thorough criteria for applying permitting standards than 
Michigan’s statute.99  Wisconsin’s permitting program is also much 
more complex, setting staggered triggering amounts for different 
decision-making standards for in-basin withdrawals and referencing 
several other state permitting programs.100  The exception standard for 
approving diversions is slightly more complex than Michigan’s, 
where diversions out of the basin cannot occur.101  Likely, the 
exception standard will be at play frequently in Wisconsin, as most of 
the state lies outside of the basin and the fastest growing communities 
lie on the basin lines.102 
Unlike Michigan’s statute, Wisconsin’s implementing legislation 
attempts to freeze the scope of the public trust doctrine as 
traditionally applied in the state.  Both the statute ratifying the 
Compact103 and the provision implementing the Compact’s standards 
for withdrawal and diversion permits104 contain identical language: 
 
98 Id. § 281.346(5)(b) (requiring permits to contain: (1) a withdrawal amount; (2) 
provisions for estimating, monitoring, and reporting “substantial increases in water loss 
resulting from increases in withdrawal amounts”; (3) “[r]equirements for estimating the 
amount withdrawn, monitoring . . . if necessary, and reporting the results”; (4) 
“[r]equirements for water conservation”; (5) “[l]imits on the location and dates or seasons 
of the withdrawal and on the allowable uses of the water”; (5m) any limit on the 
withdrawal amount necessary for compliance with the decision-making standard if it 
applies; (6) “[c]onditions on any diversion . . . made by the person making the 
withdrawal”; (6m) in certain circumstances, the criteria listed in WIS. STAT. § 
281.35(6)(a); and (7) conditions ensuring the “withdrawal does not cause significant 
adverse environmental impact” if the withdrawal is from a surface water body tributary 
and would result in a net loss of more than ninety-five percent of the water withdrawn). 
99 E.g., id. § 281.346(5)(d)(2), (9)(b)(1)–(2).  See also Memorandum from the 
Wisconsin Legislative Council on Great Lakes Compact Law (2007 Wisconsin Act 227): 
DNR Rule-Making, 3–6, IM-2008-08, available at http://www.legis.state.wi.us/lc/ 
publications/im/im_2008_08.pdf (last visited Jan. 25, 2010) (providing a chart that lists 
rulemaking the department may or must do under the Compact) (on file with author). 
100 E.g., WIS. STAT. § 281.346(5)(e)(1) (requiring a WDNR permit according to the 
“state decision-making standard” for new or increased withdrawals over 1,000,000 gpd but 
less than 10,000,000 gpd, and for existing withdrawals of that volume not covered by one 
of two listed general permits under different statutory sections unless the withdrawal is for 
a public water supply to serve a population of at least 10,000, which must comply instead 
with a “water supply service area plan” under a different statutory section); see also id. § 
281.346(5)(e)(2), (d)(3). 
101 See supra notes 79–80 and accompanying text. 
102 See supra notes 28–29, 32 and accompanying text. 
103 WIS. STAT. § 281.343. 
104 Id. § 281.346. 
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“Nothing in this section may be interpreted to change the application 
of the public trust doctrine under article IX, section 1, of the 
Wisconsin Constitution or to create any new public trust rights.”  This 
apparent savings clause raises the question of whether the state has 
the authority to freeze the public trust doctrine under the Compact, 
which applies to a broader scope of waters than traditionally 
recognized under Wisconsin’s public trust doctrine.  As a signatory to 
the Compact, Wisconsin cannot legislate in contradiction to its 
provisions.105  Thus, a frozen public trust doctrine in Wisconsin that 
cannot reach diversions and withdrawals regulated by the Great Lakes 
Compact seems forbidden by the Compact itself. 
As discussed below,106 the traditional public trust doctrines in 
Michigan and Wisconsin have a more limited scope than the 
Compact.  Because the Compact both embraces an expansive public 
trust doctrine and preserves state common law water rights, the 
trustee obligations created by the scope of the Compact’s public trust 
doctrine must be reconciled with the common law traditions in 
Michigan and Wisconsin. 
II 
THE TRADITIONAL PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE 
The public trust doctrine provides that states hold navigable waters 
in trust for the public.107  The Northwest Ordinance, passed in 1787 to 
establish a territorial government and provide for eventual admission 
to the union of states formed from the Northwest Territory,108 
preserved public ownership of all navigable waterways, announcing 
that “navigable [w]aters leading into the Mississippi and St. 
Lawrence, and the carrying places between the same shall be common 
 
105 See, e.g., Bi-State Dev. Agency of Mo.-Ill. Metro. Dist. v. Dir. of Revenue, 781 
S.W.2d 80, 82 (Mo. 1989) (“[I]t is within the competency of a State, which is a party to a 
compact with another State, to legislate in respect of matters covered by the compact so 
long as such legislative action is in approbation and not in reprobation of the compact.”) 
(citations omitted) (emphasis added); see also Compact, supra note 3, § 9.3 (“Each 
provision of this Compact is considered material to the entire Compact, and failure to 
implement or adhere to any provision may be considered a material breach.”). 
106 See infra notes 123–33 and accompanying text (discussing the scope of Michigan’s 
public trust doctrine).  See also infra notes 161–71 and accompanying text (discussing the 
scope of Wisconsin’s public trust doctrine). 
107 Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 456 (1892) (quoting Martin v. Wadell’s 
Lessee, 41 U.S. 367, 410 (1842)). 
108 1 MELVIN I. UROFSKY & PAUL FINKELMAN, DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL HISTORY 88 (Oxford University Press 3d ed. 2008). 
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highways, and forever free.”109  Wisconsin and Michigan were both 
originally part of the Northwest Territory and are bound by the terms 
of the Northwest Ordinance, making adoption of the public trust 
doctrine inherent in their statehood status.110 
Michigan and Wisconsin have adopted the doctrine as a settled 
matter of law.111  Wisconsin’s constitution contains language directly 
from the Northwest Ordinance.112  Michigan’s common law applied 
the public trust doctrine as early as 1843.113  Litigants have used the 
public trust doctrine in each state to protect the public’s rights of free 
navigation, fishing, hunting, and recreation on navigable waters.114  
Courts have defined navigable waters broadly in Wisconsin, less so in 
Michigan.115  In both states the public has always unquestionably 
owned the beds and waters of the Great Lakes themselves.116 
The public trust doctrine differs in many respects between 
Michigan and Wisconsin.  The law in both states, but especially in 
Wisconsin, is dense and the product both of common law and statutes.  
This section examines the scope of the doctrine, including trustee 
management obligations and citizen standing rules, in both Michigan 
and Wisconsin. 
A.  The Public Trust Doctrine in Michigan 
Because Michigan was formed out of the Northwest Territory, 
Michigan courts have cited the Northwest Ordinance as making the 
 
109 An Ordinance for the Territory of the United States North West of the Ohio River, in 
NORTHWEST ORDINANCE: ESSAYS ON ITS FORMULATION, PROVISIONS AND LEGACY 126 
(Frederick D. Williams ed. 1989). 
110 See supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
111 See, e.g., Glass v. Goeckel, 703 N.W.2d 58, 64 (Mich. 2005) (citing Nedtweg v. 
Wallace, 208 N.W. 51 (Mich. 1926)); R.W. Docks & Slips v. State Dep’t of Natural Res., 
628 N.W.2d 781, 788 (Wis. 2001) (citing Franzini v. Layland, 97 N.W. 499 (Wis. 1903)). 
112 WIS. CONST. art. IX, § 1. 
113 People v. Silberwood, 67 N.W. 1087, 1088 (Mich. 1896) (citing La Plaisance Bay 
Harbor Co. v. City of Monroe, Walk. Ch. 155 (Mich. Ch. 1843)). 
114 See infra notes 123–33 and accompanying text (discussing the scope of Michigan’s 
public trust doctrine).  See infra notes 161–71 and accompanying text (discussing the 
scope of Wisconsin’s public trust doctrine). 
115 See infra notes 123–33 and accompanying text (discussing the scope of Michigan’s 
public trust doctrine).  See infra notes 161–71 and accompanying text (discussing the 
scope of Wisconsin’s public trust doctrine). 
116 Glass, 703 N.W.2d at 64 (citing Silberwood, 67 N.W. at 1089); R.W. Docks & Slips, 
628 N.W.2d at 787; City of Milwaukee v. State, 214 N.W. 820, 826 (Wis. 1927) (citing 
McLennan v. Prentice, 55 N.W. 764, 770 (Wis. 1893)). 
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public trust doctrine “an inalienable obligation of sovereignty.”117  
Michigan courts have also based the public trust doctrine in the state’s 
common law tradition,118 beginning with the Michigan Supreme 
Court’s 1896 adoption119 of the seminal U.S. Supreme Court case, 
Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Illinois.120  In 1970, Michigan 
included statutory protection of the public trust in “air, water, and 
other natural resources” from “pollution, impairment, or destruction” 
in the Michigan Environmental Protection Act (MEPA),121 but state 
courts have interpreted MEPA and other statutory public trust 
provisions to have no effect on Michigan’s common law public trust 
doctrine.122 
1.  The Scope of Michigan’s Public Trust Doctrine 
Michigan courts have applied the public trust doctrine only to 
navigable waters,123 continuing to use the most traditional tests for 
defining which waters are navigable.124  Although Michigan’s inland 
lakes and streams, wetlands, and groundwater all lie within the Great 
Lakes Basin, and thus are covered by the Compact’s diversion and 
withdrawal regulations, Michigan courts have not always found these 
waters to be within the scope of the public trust. 
 
117 Nedtweg v. Wallace, 208 N.W. 51, 52 (Mich. 1926); see also Moore v. Sanborne, 2 
Mich. 519, 525 (Mich. 1853) (“The Ordinance of 1787, would supersede this doctrine of 
the necessity of usage or custom, to establish a public right over our rivers, even were such 
the established rule of the common law.”); State v. Lake St. Clair Fishing & Shooting 
Club, 87 N.W. 117, 125 (Mich. 1901) (“The federal government had only a title in trust for 
future states, with certain powers in relation to navigation.  On the admission of Michigan, 
all of said submerged land covered by this lake, to high-water mark, passed to the state in 
its sovereign right . . . in trust for the public, according to the original cession from 
Virginia and the ordinance of 1787.”); Glass, 703 N.W.2d at 74 (citing the Northwest 
Ordinance as requiring the court to “protect the Great Lakes as ‘common highways’”). 
118 Glass, 703 N.W.2d at 62 (citing Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 435 
(1892); Nedtweg, 208 N.W. at 52). 
119 Silberwood, 67 N.W. at 1089 (“It seems to me the reasoning of this case [Illinois 
Central] is without flaw, and that the law enunciated therein ought to stand as the law of 
this state.”). 
120 146 U.S. 387. 
121 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 324.1701(1) (2008). 
122 See Mich. Citizens for Water Conservation v. Nestle Waters N. Am., Inc. (Nestle I), 
709 N.W.2d 174, 221 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 737 N.W.2d 447 
(Mich. 2007) (limiting its discussion to the standing issue and passing on the merits of the 
other issues appealed); see also Glass, 703 N.W.2d at 66–67 (discussing the Great Lakes 
Submerged Lands Act). 
123 Bott v. Comm’n of Natural Res. of Mich., 327 N.W.2d 838, 846 (Mich. 1982). 
124 Nestle I, 709 N.W.2d at 217–18. 
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The most recent Michigan court to discuss the public trust 
doctrine’s applicability to inland waters was the Michigan Court of 
Appeals in Michigan Citizens for Water Conservation v. Nestle 
Waters North America, Inc. (Nestle I).125  In 2005, the Nestle I court 
upheld a trial court’s injunctive relief against a water bottling 
company that was pumping 400 gallons of water per minute from an 
MDEQ-permitted well.126  The plaintiffs claimed, among other things, 
a violation of the public trust doctrine.127  The court of appeals 
expressly refused to apply the public trust doctrine to waters that were 
not navigable under a log-flotation test.128 
Michigan courts developed the log-flotation test in the nineteenth 
century to determine navigability according to commercial use of 
waters.129  Navigability under this test requires a showing that a water 
body is, or was at some earlier time, capable of floating “large mill 
logs” twenty to forty feet long.130  Because the Michigan Supreme 
Court’s rationale for the public trust doctrine is to protect navigable 
waters “for use as highways of commerce,” that court in 1982, in Bott 
v. Commission of Natural Resources,131 upheld a court of appeals’ 
decision that the trust did “not attach to lakes unconnected to other 
waterways or to lakes with only one inlet or outlet.”132  In Nestle I, the 
court of appeals relied on Bott in refusing to consider the more 
modern recreational test for determining navigability.133 
This narrow scope prevents Michigan’s public trust doctrine from 
protecting groundwater, non-navigable tributaries, or most wetlands.  
This limit is inconsistent with the Compact, modern understandings of 
interconnected water systems, and the social and economic worth of 
 
125 Id. (limiting its discussion to standing and avoiding the merits). 
126 Id. at 207–08 (granting a partial injunction). 
127 See id. at 184–85. 
128 Id. at 217–18.  Under the log-flotation test, navigability requires evidence that the 
stream was historically used to float logs, a demonstration that the stream can currently 
float logs, or a comparison with streams already determined navigable by either of those 
two methods.  Id. at 219.  Seasonal capability of log-flotation is sufficient to prove 
navigability.  Id. at 218. 
129 Moore v. Sanborne, 2 Mich. 519, 525 (Mich. 1853) (“[I]n a region where the 
principal business is lumbering, or the pursuit of any particular branch of manufacturing or 
trade, the public claim to a right of passage along its streams must depend upon their 
capacity for the use to which they can be made subservient.”). 
130 Nestle I, 709 N.W.2d at 218–19 (citing Moore, 2 Mich. at 526). 
131 327 N.W.2d 838, 846 (Mich. 1982). 
132 Id. at 845–46. 
133 Nestle I, 709 N.W.2d at 218. 
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waterways incapable of supporting nineteenth century logging 
practices. 
But the trust provisions in the Compact clearly do reach non-
navigable waters and groundwater, and Michigan cannot ignore its 
trustee obligations under the Compact.134  Thus, when regulating 
diversions and withdrawals, MDEQ must consider the statewide 
public interest as paramount.135  Approved diversions and 
withdrawals of groundwater must not only comply with the specific 
criteria in the Compact,136 but Michigan must also ensure that such 
uses do not significantly impair the public’s interest under the public 
trust doctrine.137 
Common law water rights in Michigan permit reasonable 
groundwater use that does not interfere with a neighbor’s reasonable 
use of water below the neighbor’s land.138  Because Michigan’s public 
trust doctrine does not apply to groundwater, these common law use 
rights do not require congruity with the interests of the public in 
general.  The Compact, however, protects the public interest in 
diversions and withdrawals of Great Lakes water, regardless of 
navigability, and obligates MDEQ, as a trustee of public waters, 
where Michigan’s traditional public trust doctrine may not.  
Therefore, the consequence of the Compact’s extension of the public 
trust doctrine to diversions and withdrawals of groundwater is to 
require consideration of a broader class of interests affected by use of 
the water, and to require that consideration be made by the state 
before the use occurs. 
2.  State Trustee Obligations 
Under the public trust doctrine, the state must make a reasoned 
determination that any devotion of trust resources to private use 
serves the public interest.139  The state may alienate trust resources 
 
134 See supra notes 13–16 and accompanying text. 
135 Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 435 (1892). 
136 Compact, supra note 3, § 4.3(3). 
137 Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 146 U.S. at 435. 
138 See Hand, supra note 85. 
139 Obrecht v. Nat’l Gypsum Co., 105 N.W.2d 143, 149 (Mich. 1960).  See also Ill. 
Cent. R.R. Co., 146 U.S. at 435 (asserting that sovereign conveyance of trust resources is 
permitted only “when that can be done without substantial impairment of the interest of 
the public in the waters.”). 
 2009]   The Great Lakes Compact and the Public Trust Doctrine 475 
only if the alienation is in the public interest.140  Also, because the 
state always has owned trust property, regardless of any title that may 
have passed to a private individual,141 takings claims cannot succeed 
against the state for regulating the use of trust property.142 
The public trust doctrine has often been invoked in Michigan as a 
defense to trespass claims143 and as a basis for quieting title to certain 
lands.144  When the state claims to be furthering the trust, either 
through alienation or regulation of trust property, Michigan courts 
almost universally uphold the state’s position as lawful.145  But no 
examples exist of cases where a Michigan court employed the public 
trust doctrine as a “hard look doctrine” in order to require further 
consideration of the public interest by the state.  The number of 
Michigan cases involving citizen challenges to state regulation of 
trust resources is equally scant;146 it is uncertain whether the court’s 
 
140 People v. Silberwood, 67 N.W. 1087, 1089 (Mich. 1896) (upholding legislative 
authority to convey submerged lands in Lake Erie for public shooting grounds); Nedtweg 
v. Wallace, 208 N.W. 51, 54 (Mich. 1926) (upholding legislative authority to grant ninety-
nine-year leases of relicted lakebed because the land could never be sold—the leases 
remained subject to public rights of navigation, hunting, and fishing, and the legislature 
had the power to determine that such leases were in the public’s best interest).  Also, 
claims of adverse possession cannot succeed on lands claimed by the state under the public 
trust doctrine, regardless of private development on the land. State v. Lake St. Clair 
Fishing & Shooting Club, 87 N.W. 117, 125 (Mich. 1901). 
141 Lake St. Clair Fishing & Shooting Club, 87 N.W. at 125; see also State v. Venice of 
Am. Land Co., 125 N.W. 770, 774 (Mich. 1910) (holding that title claimed by a grant from 
the British crown does not extend to land submerged at the time of statehood). 
142 Lake St. Clair Fishing & Shooting Club, 87 N.W. at 125. 
143 Glass v. Goeckel, 703 N.W.2d 58, 63 (Mich. 2005); Collins v. Gerhardt, 211 N.W. 
115, 116 (Mich. 1926). 
144 Lake St. Clair Fishing & Shooting Club, 87 N.W. at 119; Venice of America Land 
Co., 125 N.W. at 771; Nedtweg, 208 N.W. at 52 (issuing a writ of mandamus to the state 
Commission of Conservation to grant a lease in accordance with a statute leasing trust 
land); Hilt v. Weber, 233 N.W. 159, 160 (Mich. 1930). 
145 See Obrecht v. Nat’l Gypsum Co., 105 N.W. 2d 143, 149–50 (requiring state 
permission for alienation of trust land); People ex rel. MacMullan v. Babcock, 196 
N.W.2d 489, 497 (Mich. Ct. App. 1972) (granting the state an injunction against property 
owners seeking to place a land fill in Lake St. Clair).  But see Peterman v. State Dept. of 
Natural Res., 521 N.W.2d 499, 511–12 (Mich. 1994) (awarding compensation to riparian 
owners for property above the high water mark under the general rule that “loss of fast 
lands must be compensated,” and awarding compensation for property below the high 
water mark because “[t]he taking of the property served no public interest” because the 
state could have improved navigation without destroying plaintiff’s beach). 
146 Contra Bertram C. Frey & Andrew Mutz, The Public Trust in Surface Waterways 
and Submerged Lands of the Great Lakes States, 40 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 907, 985 
(2007) (citing Obrecht as an example of a private party suing under the public trust 
doctrine).  However, in Obrecht, riparian homeowners sued a mining company for private  
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apparent unwillingness to review agency public trust decisions with 
skepticism is a reflection of especially convincing state decision 
making or merely judicial deference. 
3.  Citizen Standing to Enforce Michigan’s Public Trust Doctrine 
There was no Michigan decision in which a citizen filed suit to 
enforce the public trust doctrine against private parties before 
MEPA’s 1970 citizen suit provision.147  In 2005, in Nestle I, the 
Michigan Court of Appeals upheld standing for a citizen group 
representing the interests of riparian property owners “in the vicinity 
of” Nestle’s wells to pursue its public trust doctrine claim against 
Nestle’s groundwater pumping activities because of the hydrological 
link between the streams, lakes, and wetlands in the area at issue.148  
However, the state supreme court reversed,149 determining that the 
citizen group lacked standing because it could not show it used or had 
any “substantial interest . . . distinct from the interest of the general 
public.”150  Thus, in Michigan, citizen standing to bring public trust 
doctrine claims requires a showing of particularized injury to the 
plaintiff, not the environment, regardless of any statutory grant that 
might imply otherwise.151 
 
and public nuisance, and the state attorney general intervened, contending that the public 
trust doctrine required state approval for the defendant’s actions.  105 N.W.2d at 148.  The 
homeowners never raised the public trust doctrine claim, and the court differentiated 
between the two.  Id. 
147 See supra note 146 and accompanying text. 
148 Nestle I, 709 N.W.2d 174, 184, 225 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005). 
149  Mich. Citizens for Water Conservation v. Nestle Waters of N. Am., Inc. (Nestle II), 
737 N.W.2d 447, 456–57 (Mich. 2007) (“Were the ‘ecosystem nexus’ approach consistent 
with the operant doctrine of standing, it would justify the standing of anyone but a Martian 
to contest water withdrawals occurring in Michigan.  Traditional standing principles would 
be obliterated.”). 
150 Id. at 456. 
151 Id. at 459 (“Nothing in the language of this [constitutional] provision indicates that 
the paramount public concern for the conservation and development of Michigan’s natural 
resources and the [l]egislature’s responsibility to protect these resources compromises the 
principles of standing and renders them inapplicable to environmental plaintiffs.”); id.  
(“[P]laintiff’s belief that MEPA authorizes citizen suits does not change the calculus. . . . 
[C]itizen suits historically have conferred on the litigant a concrete private interest in the 
outcome of the suit, and therefore involved only those who have suffered either a direct or 
assigned injury in fact.”). 
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B.  The Public Trust Doctrine in Wisconsin 
The roots of Wisconsin’s public trust doctrine lie in the Northwest 
Ordinance of 1787152 and the state constitution,153 which contains 
language directly from the Ordinance.154  The state supreme court 
dated legislative codification of the common law of the public trust 
doctrine to a 1915 law delegating management and protection of the 
trust resources to state agencies.155  Consequently, much public trust 
case law in recent decades has relied as much on state administrative 
procedure as on common law principles of the trust doctrine. 
Litigants have employed Wisconsin’s public trust doctrine as a 
state defense against takings claims,156 as a citizen tool for ensuring 
proper administrative procedure,157 and as a restraint on the alienation 
of trust property.158  The scope of the Wisconsin public trust doctrine 
extends to all navigable-in-fact waters, and it protects the public’s 
interest in navigation, recreation, fishing, hunting, and aesthetic 
 
152 Ill. Steel Co. v. Bilot, 84 N.W. 855, 856 (Wis. 1901) (“The United States never had 
title, in the Northwest Territory, out of which this state was carved, to the beds of lakes, 
ponds and navigable rivers, except in trust for public purposes; and its trust in that regard 
was transferred to the state, and must there continue forever, so far as necessary to the 
enjoyment thereof by the people . . . .”). 
153 Diana Shooting Club v. Husting, 145 N.W. 816, 818 (Wis. 1914) (citing both the 
Northwest Ordinance and the state constitution); City of Milwaukee v. State, 214 N.W. 
820, 822 (Wis. 1927) (citing both the Northwest Ordinance and the state constitution); 
Muench v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 53 N.W.2d 514, 516 (Wis. 1952) (citing both the 
Northwest Ordinance and the state constitution); R.W. Docks & Slips v. State Dep’t of 
Natural Res., 628 N.W.2d 781, 787 (Wis. 2001) (“The public trust doctrine originated in 
the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 and the Wisconsin Constitution . . . .”) (citing Gillen v. 
City of Neenah, 580 N.W.2d 628 (1998)). 
154 WIS. CONST. art. IX, § 1 (“[T]he river Mississippi and the navigable waters leading 
into the Mississippi and St. Lawrence, and the carrying places between the same, shall be 
common highways and forever free.”). 
155 Muench, 53 N.W.2d at 520 (outlining the history of the Water Power Law, which 
since 1915 required a state agency to permit any dam construction on a navigable stream 
on the condition that the proposed dam did not “materially obstruct existing navigation or 
violate other public rights”) (emphasis omitted). 
156 See, e.g., R.W. Docks & Slips, 628 N.W.2d at 787 (stating that there can be no 
regulatory taking where the state denied plaintiff’s permit to develop the final seventy-one 
of 201 boat slips at a marina because riparian rights “are subject to and limited by the 
public trust doctrine”). 
157 Muench, 53 N.W.2d at 522 (accepting that citizen plaintiff was aggrieved and 
directly affected by the state action for standing purposes, based on his right as a state 
citizen to enjoy the navigable streams for recreational purposes). 
158 ABKA Ltd. P’ship v. Wis. Dep’t of Natural Res., 648 N.W.2d 854, 857 (Wis. 2002) 
(finding riparian owner’s attempt to transfer riparian rights independently from the land 
they attached to was a violation of the public trust doctrine). 
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enjoyment.159  Wisconsin courts also recognize citizen standing to 
enforce the public trust doctrine.160 
1.  The Scope of Wisconsin’s Public Trust Doctrine 
The state of Wisconsin holds navigable water bodies in trust for the 
public, defining “navigable” to mean capable of floating the 
shallowest boats used for recreation.161  The result of this recreation 
test for navigability is that the state holds a broad range of water 
bodies in the public trust, and courts define the trust corpus in terms 
of current public values rather than historic commercial viability.162  
According to the state supreme court, a water body need only be 
navigable-in-fact at regularly recurring times or “of a duration . . . to 
make it conducive to recreational uses.”163  Further, the court 
explained that the public trust doctrine in Wisconsin protects public 
rights to navigation, hunting, fishing, recreation, and aesthetic 
enjoyment of navigable-in-fact waters.164 
In 1972, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the public trust 
doctrine not only obligates the state to “protect and preserve” 
navigable waters “for fishing, recreation, and scenic beauty” but the 
public trust doctrine may also burden development rights on privately 
owned lands.165  In Just v. Marinette County,166 the court upheld a 
shore-land zoning ordinance that required landowners to obtain state 
permits before changing “the natural character of . . . land within 
1,000 feet of a navigable lake [or] 300 feet of a navigable river.”167  
Just denied the plaintiff’s regulatory takings claim, concluding that 
the developer had no “unlimited right” to an unnatural use of his 
land.168  The Wisconsin Supreme Court found the zoning ordinance 
 
159 Muench, 53 N.W.2d at 525. 
160 See infra notes 198–211 and accompanying text (discussing Wisconsin’s citizen 
standing rules to uphold the public trust doctrine). 
161 Muench, 53 N.W.2d at 519. 
162 Id. at 522. 
163 DeGayner & Co. v. Dep’t of Natural Res., 236 N.W.2d 217, 222 (Wis. 1975). 
164 Muench, 53 N.W.2d at 519–22 (explaining that public trust rights should not be 
“‘limited or curtailed by narrow construction’”) (quoting Diana Shooting Club v. Husting, 
145 N.W. 816, 820 (Wis. 1914)). 
165 Just v. Marinette County, 201 N.W.2d 761, 768 (Wis. 1972). 
166 201 N.W.2d 761 (Wis. 1972). 
167 Id. at 768. 
168 Id. (“An owner of land has no absolute and unlimited right to change the essential 
natural character of his land so as [to] use it for a purpose for which it was unsuited in its  
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constitutional169 because “the interrelationship” between the regulated 
land and the public waters triggered the state’s duty under the public 
trust doctrine to protect those waters.170  Thus, the state’s duty to 
protect navigable waters includes a duty to regulate private wetland 
fills affecting navigable waters.171  As public values changed, the 
scope of Wisconsin’s public trust doctrine changed as well. 
2.  State Trustee Obligations 
The Wisconsin legislature fulfills its obligation to protect trust 
resources largely through a series of statutes regulating private use of 
navigable waters and delegating management and enforcement 
powers to the WDNR.172  Chapter 30 of Wisconsin’s statutes requires 
 
natural state and which injures the rights of others . . . . [W]e think it is not an 
unreasonable exercise of that [police] power [in zoning] to prevent harm to public rights 
by limiting the use of private property to its natural uses.”); see also Zealy v. City of 
Waukesha, 548 N.W.2d 528, 534 (Wis. 1996) (“While loss of value is to be considered in 
determining whether a restriction is a constructive taking, value based upon changing the 
character of the land at the expense of harm to public rights is not an essential factor or 
controlling.”).  The court in Zealy denied the plaintiff’s regulatory takings claim, which 
was based on a rezoning of part of plaintiff’s land as a wetland conservancy district, 
prohibiting residential development on 8.2 acres of a 10.4 acre parcel, because the land 
could still be used for farming, its historical use.  Id. at 533–34. 
169 Just, 201 N.W.2d at 768 (affirming a modified judgment of the lower court, which 
improperly dismissed the plaintiff’s claim despite holding the zoning ordinance to be 
constitutional). 
170 Id. at 768 (“The state of Wisconsin under the trust doctrine has a duty to eradicate 
the present pollution and to prevent further pollution in its navigable waters . . . . What 
makes this case different from most condemnation or police power zoning cases is the 
interrelationship of the wetlands, the swamps[,] and the natural environment of shorelands 
to the purity of the water and to such natural resources as navigation, fishing, and scenic 
beauty.”). 
171 Id. (“Swamps and wetlands were once considered wasteland, undesirable, and not 
picturesque.  But as the people became more sophisticated, an appreciation was acquired 
that swamps and wetlands serve a vital role in nature, are part of the balance of nature[,] 
and are essential to the purity of the water in our lakes and streams.”). 
172 WIS. STAT. §§ 30.12–13, 30.18–19, 31.02 (2008) (requiring WDNR to regulate: the 
construction of structures on and the deposit of materials in navigable water; the placing of 
wharves, piers, and swimming rafts in navigable waters; diversion of water from navigable 
lakes and streams; enlargements of navigable waterways; and the construction of dams on 
navigable waterways).  See also ABKA Ltd. P’ship v. Wis. Dep’t of Natural Res., 648 
N.W.2d 854, 858–59 (Wis. 2002) (“Chapter 30 embodies a system of regulation of 
Wisconsin’s navigable waters pursuant to the public trust doctrine. . . . The legislature has 
delegated to the DNR broad authority to regulate under the public trust doctrine and to 
administer ch. 30.”) (citations omitted); State v. Trudeau, 408 N.W.2d 337, 341 (Wis. 
1987) (“[C]h. 30, Stats., generally codif[ies] a number of common law doctrines regarding 
the ownership of the beds of navigable waters.”). 
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WDNR permits for activities affecting navigable waters,173 and permit 
issuance requires an agency finding that the activity will not harm the 
public’s rights.174  The statutes also authorize the WDNR to pursue 
any violators of the public trust doctrine and to seek administrative or 
judicial relief.175  Because of this broad delegation of trust 
management powers and the detailed statutory articulation of the 
public’s interest in navigable waters,176 the public trust doctrine in 
Wisconsin is often reliant on state administrative processes.  
Wisconsin courts generally defer to state decisions that further the 
public interest,177 and they seldom require further state action in 
protection of trust resources.178 
 
173 See, e.g., WIS. STAT. § 30.12(3m)(c)(2) (authorizing WDNR to permit the 
placement of a structure on the bed of a navigable water if it will not be “detrimental to the 
public interest”). 
174 See, e.g., id. §§ 30.12(3m)(c)(1)–(3) (authorizing WDNR to issue a permit for a 
structure or deposit on the bed of a navigable water body if the department finds that it will 
not materially obstruct navigation, be detrimental to the public interest, or materially 
reduce the stream’s flow capacity); 30.18(5)(a)(1) (authorizing WDNR to issue a permit 
for a withdrawal from a stream if it finds the withdrawal will not injure any public rights in 
navigable waters). 
175 WIS. STAT. § 30.03(4); see ABKA Ltd. P’ship, 648 N.W.2d at 859 (upholding broad 
DNR authority under the statute). 
176 See supra note 173 and accompanying text.  Beyond merely requiring permits for 
activities affecting navigable waters, chapter 30 carves out exemptions to its permit 
requirements, defining limits of the public’s interest.  For example, section 30.12 lists 
twelve exceptions to its requirement of a WDNR permit for placing structures on the bed 
of navigable waters, WIS. STAT. § 30.12 (1g)(a)–(km),  including “[a]n intake or outfall 
structure that is less than [six] feet from the water side of the ordinary high-water mark 
and that is less than [twenty-five] percent of the width of the channel in which it is 
placed.”  Id. 
177 See Just v. Marinette County, 201 N.W.2d 761, 768 (Wis. 1972); Zealy v. City of 
Waukesha, 548 N.W.2d 528, 534 (Wis. 1996); Hixon v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 146 N.W.2d 
577, 589 (Wis. 1967) (upholding an agency denial of a permit and refusing to require 
agency to further explain its conclusory statement that the action was not in the public’s 
interest); Village of Menomonee Falls v. Dep’t of Natural Res., 412 N.W.2d 505, 511–12 
(Wis. Ct. App. 1987) (upholding a WDNR finding of navigability, even though against the 
great weight of the evidence); R.W. Docks & Slips v. State, 628 N.W.2d 781, 788 (Wis. 
2001) (upholding a WDNR denial of a final permit for completion of boat slip 
construction, based on the department’s decision to protect emergent weed bed, and 
denying the plaintiff’s taking claim because riparian rights were always subordinate to 
public rights); ABKA Ltd. P’ship, 648 N.W.2d at 854 (upholding WDNR’s authority under 
section 30.03(4) of the Wisconsin Code to bring an enforcement action “when it learns of 
a ‘possible violation’ of the public trust doctrine”); Baer v. Wis. Dep’t of Natural Res., 724 
N.W.2d 638, 644 (Wis. Ct. App. 2006) (agreeing with the WDNR that it had a statutory 
duty to proceed against a person it believed to be acting contrary to the public rights in a 
navigable lake).  But see Town of Ashwaubenon v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 125 N.W.2d 647, 
654 (Wis. 1963) (finding no substantial evidence for commission’s permit denial but  
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A rare case of judicial overturning of administrative decision 
making was ABKA Ltd. Partnership v. Department of Natural 
Resources,179 where in 2002 the Wisconsin Supreme Court concluded 
that a WDNR-permitted plan to convert marina property to over 400 
condominiums violated the public trust doctrine180 because it was 
inconsistent with a statutory prohibition of transferring riparian water 
rights separately from riparian land.181  A concurring opinion agreed 
with the court of appeals182 that the conversion was a public trust 
doctrine violation simply because it transferred public waters to 
private ownership.183 
Although the Wisconsin Supreme Court did not defer to the 
department’s decision to permit the conveyance, it did defer to the 
statutory restriction on riparian water rights as defining the scope of 
the public’s interest in navigable waters.184  The court identified 
several possible ways the conveyance could violate the public trust 
 
remanding for the agency to build the record if it could).  The dissent in Ashwaubenon 
argued for greater deference to the agency, id. at 655–56, and the author of that dissent 
wrote the opinion in Hixon, supra, a year later. 
178 But see Gillen v. City of Neenah, 580 N.W. 2d 628, 638 (Wis. 1998) (remanding to 
the circuit court for factual determinations regarding a possible violation of the public trust 
despite the defendants having state approval for their actions); Muench v. Pub. Serv. 
Comm’n, 53 N.W.2d 514, 524 (Wis. 1952) (finding a state statute unconstitutional because 
it delegated trust management, of state-wide interest, to local authorities); Priewe v. Wis. 
State Land & Improvement Co., 67 N.W. 918, 922 (Wis. 1896) (invalidating a legislative 
decision to drain a lake “under the guise of legislating for the public health . . . and thereby 
create a nuisance”). 
179 648 N.W.2d 854 (Wis. 2002). 
180 Id. at 857. 
181 Id. (finding a violation of Wis. Stat. § 30.133).  ABKA claimed compliance with the 
statute by declaring the condominium unit to be a “four-by-five-by-six inch ‘lock box’” 
located on land with waterfront real estate and riparian use rights as an appurtenance.  Id.  
The court concluded that because any proposal that the lock boxes were intended for 
independent use was a “sham,” the conveyance of the riparian rights violated section 
30.133.  Id. at 865. 
182 Id. at 870 (Bablitch, J., concurring). 
183 Id. (“[A]llowing one riparian owner to divide the owner’s riparian zone and 
separately convey legal interest in the resulting ‘lots’ will have significant detrimental 
effect on the public waters of this state. . . . One can easily imagine the damage to the 
aesthetic appeal of our public waters if this concept is allowed.”). 
184 Id. at 862.  In discussing WDNR’s jurisdiction in the case, the court listed three 
possible public trust doctrine violations: “ABKA’s dockominium project may have been 
exceeding its reasonable use of the [s]tate’s navigable waters, may have been detrimental 
to the public interest as that concept is used in ch. 30, or, as illustrated by the arguments 
before the ALJ, may have run afoul of § 30.133.”  Id. at 860. 
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doctrine, including unreasonable use of navigable waters,185 but it 
determined only that the conveyance violated “the public trust 
doctrine as embodied in ch[apter] 30.”186  It refrained from discussing 
specifically how or why such a conveyance would harm the public 
interest.  By resolving this public trust doctrine claim solely through 
statutory interpretation focused on definitions of condominium 
units187 the court apparently denied any trustee obligations in the state 
judiciary.188  Moreover, the court left unanswered the question of 
whether the public trust doctrine required the state to prohibit such 
transfers of riparian rights or only empowered the state to do so. 
This reluctance to impose judicial limits on legislative 
determinations of the public trust doctrine’s scope in Wisconsin may 
prove to be a hurdle to anyone seeking enforcement of state trustee 
obligations under the Compact because Wisconsin’s implementing 
legislation requires any Compact interpretation by the state to not 
affect Wisconsin’s public trust doctrine.189  However, judicial 
deference to legislative definitions regarding the public trust doctrine 
cannot frustrate implementation of express Compact provisions.190 
The Compact recognizes a public trust in basin waters regardless of 
navigability, even groundwater.191  Wisconsin’s public trust doctrine 
does not reach non-navigable surface waters or groundwater, but state 
courts must enforce the Compact’s trust provision by protecting the 
public’s interest in Great Lakes water used for diversions and 
withdrawals.  The Compact’s public trust only reaches basin water 
when its use is regulated under the Compact.  By thus differentiating 
 
185 Id. 
186 Id. at 859 (defining the grounds for WDNR jurisdiction); id. at 857 (“We agree with 
the court of appeals that the ALJ erred and that ABKA’s conversion of its marina to a 
condominium form of ownership violated the public trust doctrine.  However, we 
determine that the reason ABKA violated the public trust doctrine was because it 
attempted to convey condominium property contrary to Wis. Stat. § 30.133 (1995–96), 
which prohibits certain transfers of riparian rights.”). 
187 Id. at 862. 
188 Id. at 858 (“Regulation and enforcement of this public trust rests with both the 
legislature and the DNR.”).  By contrast, Michigan courts see themselves as trustees.  See 
supra note 90 and accompanying text. 
189 See supra notes 103–04 and accompanying text. 
190 Compact, supra note 3, § 9.3 (“Each provision of this Compact is considered 
material to the entire Compact, and failure to implement or adhere to any provision may be 
considered a material breach.”). 
191 Id. §§ 1.2 (defining “[w]aters of the [b]asin” to include groundwater), 1.3(1)(a) 
(“The [w]aters of the [b]asin are precious public natural resources shared and held in trust 
by the [s]tates.”). 
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the Compact trust from the traditional public trust, state courts will 
uphold both the Compact and the Compact-implementing legislation 
in Wisconsin. 
The Compact preserves common law rights192 in Wisconsin to use 
groundwater for a “beneficial purpose” that does not lower the water 
table, reduce artesian pressure, or substantially affect a watercourse or 
lake.193  But these rights are more accurately described as limits on 
tort liability, which serve as defenses to a neighboring landowner’s 
challenge of a person’s use.194  The Compact’s public trust doctrine 
requires the state to ensure diversions and withdrawals of 
groundwater are consistent with the protected statewide interest in the 
use of the Great Lakes Basin waters for generations to come.195  
Applying the Compact’s public trust doctrine to groundwater will 
thus shift the court’s focus from remedying neighborly harm after the 
fact to preventing public harm before diversions and withdrawals take 
place.  As an additional requirement beyond Compact permitting 
standards, the state’s public trust doctrine ensures the protection of 
the public interest as paramount and explicitly requires a state 
showing that any private alienation is in the general public’s best 
interest.196 
3.  Citizen Standing to Enforce Wisconsin’s Public Trust Doctrine 
The public trust doctrine allows Wisconsin citizens to bring suits to 
protect public rights in navigable waters under two conditions.  First, 
the Wisconsin Supreme Court ruled in 1974, in State v. Deetz,197 that 
the public trust doctrine does not create an independent cause of 
action.198  Thus, a plaintiff, whether the state or a private citizen, must 
assert a violation of an existing statute or common law in order to 
obtain judicial relief for injury under the public trust doctrine.199  
 
192 Id. § 8.1(2). 
193 See Michael J. Cain, Wisconsin, in 6 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS 1185, 1186 
(Robert E. Beck ed. 2005). 
194 See id. (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts). 
195 Compact, supra note 3, § 1.3(1)(f).  See also supra note 41 and accompanying text 
(quoting from the legislative history of the Compact). 
196 Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 455–56 (1892). 
197 224 N.W.2d 407, 412 (Wis. 1974). 
198 Id. at 412–13 (denying the attorney general standing to bring a public trust doctrine 
claim because there was no public nuisance and the public trust doctrine “merely gives the 
state standing as trustee to vindicate any rights that are infringed upon by existing law”). 
199 Id. at 413. 
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Because chapter 30 of Wisconsin’s statutes contains an extensive 
codification of the public trust doctrine,200 and also provides a public 
nuisance cause of action against any violation of the chapter,201 
plaintiffs usually have little difficulty meeting the Deetz 
requirement.202 
The second standing requirement is that a public trust doctrine 
claim must allege some injury to navigable waters.203  In Wisconsin 
Environmental Decade v. Public Service Commission (WED),204 a 
case involving a public trust claim relating to natural gas regulation, 
without mention of navigable waters, the Wisconsin Supreme Court 
proved “unwilling to adopt a rule that any allegation of harm to the 
environment raises, by implication, an allegation of harm to navigable 
waterways.”205  Although the court would not imply harm to 
navigable waters, it stopped short of requiring direct harm to 
navigable waters.206  The wetland cases discussed above207 
demonstrated a judicial willingness to recognize trust interests in 
resources that affect the navigable waters.  Further, as the WED court 
stated, “the law of standing in Wisconsin should not be construed 
narrowly or restrictively.”208  Thus, because state standing rules 
govern citizen claims under the Compact,209 Wisconsin’s standing 
rules would likely permit citizens to challenge state trustee 
obligations under the Compact. 
 
200 See supra notes 172, 176, and accompanying text. 
201 WIS. STAT. § 30.294 (2008) (“Every violation of this chapter is declared to be a 
public nuisance and may be prohibited by injunction and may be abated by legal action 
brought by any person.”). 
202 But see Borsellino v. Wis. Dep’t of Natural Res., 606 N.W.2d 255, 261 (Wis. Ct. 
App. 1999) (finding no cause of action based “on a general allegation of a violation of the 
public trust doctrine”). 
203 Wis. Envtl. Decade, Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 230 N.W.2d 243, 250 (Wis. 1975). 
204 Id. 
205 Id. 
206 Id. (“[T]he allegations of the petition, even as amended and liberally construed, fail 
to assert an interest with regard to the preservation or protection of navigable waters or 
any related interest which has been previously recognized by this court.”) (emphasis 
added). 
207 Just v. Marinette County, 201 N.W.2d 761 (Wis. 1972).  See supra note 168 and 
accompanying text. 
208 Wis. Envtl. Decade, Inc., 230 N.W.2d at 249. 
209 Compact, supra note 3, § 7.3(1). 
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III 
THE COMPACT TRUST AS DISTINCT FROM THE TRADITIONAL 
PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE 
The Compact proclaims that Great Lakes Basin waters are 
“precious public natural resources shared and held in trust by the 
[s]tates”210 and defines basin waters to include surface water, 
groundwater, connecting channels, “and other bodies of water.”211  It 
also charges the Compact states with “a shared duty to protect, 
conserve, restore, improve and manage” the basin waters “for the use, 
benefit and enjoyment of all their citizens.”212  With these provisions, 
the Compact adopted a public trust doctrine that encompasses all 
surface and groundwater in the Great Lakes Basin, burdening the 
Compact states with trustee obligations to protect those waters. 
As discussed above,213 the public trust doctrine in Michigan 
currently applies only to waters that are navigable according to a log-
flotation test.214  Consequently, the state public trust doctrine does not 
include groundwater215 or surface water incapable of floating a log 
twenty to forty feet long.216  In Wisconsin, on the other hand, the 
legislature and courts recognize the public trust doctrine extends to 
waters that are navigable “for any purpose.”217  Although the result is 
a broader scope of trust waters in Wisconsin than in Michigan, 
Wisconsin’s public trust doctrine does not reach groundwater.218  In 
fact, no state court has interpreted the public trust doctrine to include 
groundwater.219  Consequently, the Compact expressly adopts a public 
 
210 Id. § 1.3(1)(a) (emphasis added). 
211 Id. § 1.2. 
212 Id. § 1.3(1)(f). 
213 See supra notes 128–33 and accompanying text. 
214 Nestle I, 709 N.W.2d 174, 219 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005). 
215 Id. 
216 Id. 
217 WIS. STAT. § 30.10 (2008) (defining navigable lakes and streams and declaring all 
navigable water, lakes, and streams to be public). 
218 See supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
219 See supra note 22 and accompanying text.  But see Rettkowski v. Dep’t of Ecology, 
858 P.2d 232, 243–45 (Wash. 1993) (Guy, J., dissenting) (advocating for the extension of 
the public trust doctrine to groundwater).  See also Erik Swenson, Comment, Public Trust 
Doctrine and Groundwater Rights, 53 U. MIAMI L. REV. 363 (1999) (arguing that state 
courts should interpret the public trust doctrine to reach groundwater, with a focus on 
Florida’s law). 
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trust that is broader in scope than the traditional public trust doctrines 
in Michigan, Wisconsin, or any other Compact state.220 
Although the Compact expressly adopts a public trust doctrine that 
embraces all basin water, regardless of navigability,221 it also 
preserves state common law water rights,222 declaring: “Nothing 
contained in this Compact shall be construed as affecting or intending 
to affect or in any way to interfere with the law of the respective 
[p]arties relating to common law [w]ater rights.”223  When a state 
holds a water body in trust for the public, the trust restricts use rights 
to those that do not harm the protected public interests in the water.224  
For example, Wisconsin protects the public’s interest in aesthetic 
enjoyment to public trust waters, so water rights to those waters 
cannot harm that public interest.225  Because the Compact regulates 
diversions and withdrawals of water not governed by state public trust 
doctrines in Michigan and Wisconsin, the Compact trust provision 
limits common law water use rights by requiring use to not only be 
reasonable and without harm to neighboring users,226 but also to be 
consistent with the general public’s interest in protecting the Great 
Lakes waters for future generations.227  A distinct Compact trust in 
diversions and withdrawals of basin water gives effect to both the 
Compact’s express adoption of the public trust doctrine and its 
disclaimer of effect on common law water rights. 
A distinct Compact trust also reconciles the Compact’s trust 
provision with the implementing legislation in Wisconsin, which 
asserts that the Compact may not “be interpreted to change the 
application of the public trust doctrine . . . or to create any new public 
 
220 Compact, supra note 3, § 1.3(1)(a). 
221 Id. 
222 Id. § 8.1(2). 
223 Id. 
224 Illinois Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 435 (1892) (asserting that use of 
trust resources must be “without substantial impairment of the interest of the public in the 
waters”). 
225 Muench v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 53 N.W.2d 514, 525 (Wis. 1952) (remanding to the 
Public Service Commission to determine whether the construction of a dam would violate 
public rights in navigable waters). 
226 Cf. Hand, supra note 85, at 681–85 (discussing common law water rights in 
Michigan); Nestle I, 709 N.W.2d 174, 194–204 (2005) (discussing common law water 
rights in Michigan); Cain, supra note 193, at 1185–92 (discussing common law water 
rights in Wisconsin); State v. Michels Pipeline Constr., Inc., 217 N.W.2d 339, 350–51 
(1974) (discussing common law water rights in Wisconsin). 
227 Compact, supra note 3, § 1.3(1)(f). 
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trust rights.”228  Since Wisconsin cannot legislate inconsistently with 
the express provisions of the Compact,229 and the Compact plainly (1) 
recognizes a public trust in all Great Lakes Basin waters230 and (2) 
requires the states to make Compact permitting decisions consistent 
with that trust,231 the Compact trust must be distinct from Wisconsin’s 
public trust doctrine.  Moreover, applying the Compact trust to 
diversions and withdrawals of basin waters does not affect how 
Wisconsin applies its traditional public trust doctrine. 
This Part distinguishes the Compact trust from traditional state 
public trust doctrines by emphasizing the purposes and structure of 
the Compact.  The Part then considers the application of the Compact 
trust in Michigan, in light of judicial reluctance to expand the scope 
of the traditional public trust doctrine there, and in Wisconsin, in light 
of that state’s Compact-implementing legislation. 
A.  State Law and the Compact Trust 
Because the Compact expressly establishes a separate public trust 
doctrine governing diversions and withdrawals, traditional state 
public trust doctrines do not define the limits of the Compact trust.  
Instead, the Compact itself defines the Compact trust’s scope.  Where 
the Compact leaves water use management decisions to state 
discretion, the Compact’s provisions no longer govern, and the 
Compact trust is inapplicable.  For example, the Compact authorizes 
individual state authorities to determine the scope and threshold of 
Compact regulation over new or increased withdrawals for in-basin 
use.232  Compact permitting requirements will not apply to 
withdrawals of basin water in amounts below these state-specific 
levels, and therefore those withdrawals do not trigger Compact trustee 
obligations either. 
The Compact requires anyone proposing to divert or withdraw 
basin waters under the Compact to obtain a state permit.233  Since 
 
228 WIS. STAT. §§ 281.343(1), 281.346(2)(g) (2008). 
229 See supra note 105 and accompanying text. 
230 Compact, supra note 3, § 1.3(1)(a); see also supra notes 43–45 and accompanying 
text. 
231 Id. § 1.3(1)(f) (“The Parties have a shared duty to protect, conserve, restore, 
improve and manage the renewable but finite [w]aters of the [b]asin for the use, benefit, 
and enjoyment of all their citizens, including generations yet to come.”) (emphasis added). 
232 Id. § 4.10(1). 
233 Id. § 4.8. 
 488 J. ENVTL. LAW AND LITIGATION [Vol. 24, 455 
Compact provisions govern state decision-making processes in 
granting or denying applicable diversion or withdrawal permits,234 
state decisions under the Compact must satisfy the Compact-imposed 
public trust doctrine.235  But beyond the Compact’s reach, basin water 
use remains governed by any relevant state law, including the state 
public trust doctrines.  Where the Compact and the traditional public 
trust doctrine both apply, the Compact trust preempts the state public 
trust doctrines.236  The result is two separate public trust doctrines in 
Compact states, and thus two different sets of rules governing water 
use. 
Traditional state public trust doctrines are rooted in historically 
recognized public rights to waterways, which may be traced in both 
Michigan and Wisconsin to the Northwest Ordinance.237  
Consequently, both states limit the scope of their public trust 
doctrines in terms of navigability, in Michigan using a log-flotation 
test based on nineteenth-century navigation needs,238 and in 
Wisconsin using a recreation test based on the water’s capacity for 
recreational use.239  The Compact trust, in contrast, is rooted in the 
purposes of the Compact, a modern recognition of public rights to 
preserve the Great Lakes Basin for the region and its future 
citizens.240  The Compact claims state ownership of Great Lakes 
Basin water in the context of its purpose: to facilitate cooperative, 
regional, science-based efforts to “protect, conserve, restore, improve 
and effectively manage” the basin waters and ecosystem.241 
The Compact trust is consistent with the Compact’s regional 
management structure, which aims to strike a balance between 
facilitating “consistent approaches to [w]ater management” among 
 
234 Id. § 4.3(3). 
235 Id. § 1.3(1)(f). 
236 Id. § 9.1 (repealing all acts or parts of acts inconsistent with the Compact); see also 
id. § 9.3 (stating that “failure to implement or adhere to any provision” of the Compact 
“may be considered a material breach”). 
237 See supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
238 See supra notes 129–30 and accompanying text. 
239 See supra notes 161–64 and accompanying text. 
240 Compact, supra note 3, § 1.3(1)(f) (“The Parties have a shared duty to protect, 
conserve, restore, improve and manage the renewable but finite [w]aters of the [b]asin for 
the use, benefit and enjoyment of all their citizens, including generations yet to come.”); 
id. § 1.3(1)(e) (“Continued sustainable, accessible and adequate [w]ater supplies for the 
people and economy of the Basin are of vital importance[.]”). 
241 Id. § 1.3(2)(a). 
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party states and “retaining [s]tate management authority over [w]ater 
management decisions within the [b]asin.”242  The Compact seeks to 
further use of “unified and cooperative principles” for managing 
Great Lakes waters by all compact states.243  For example, the 
Compact requires unanimous state approval for large diversions.244  
The Compact’s criteria and the Compact trust ensure some regional 
consistency in state decision making, but most permitting decisions 
remain with the individual states. 
B.  The Compact Trust in Michigan 
Because Michigan lies entirely within the Great Lakes Basin,245 the 
Compact’s public trust doctrine reaches all of Michigan’s waters, 
regardless of navigability, when the Compact controls their use.  In 
Michigan, the Compact governs intrabasin transfers of over one 
hundred thousand gallons per day and any withdrawals of over two 
million gallons per day,246 requiring a permit from the state.247  The 
Compact requires the state, as trustee of the basin waters, to grant or 
deny such permits consistently with the public trust it established.248 
Although the Compact provisions extend the public trust to 
diversions and withdrawals of basin waters regardless of navigability, 
in Nestle I the Michigan Court of Appeals rejected the argument that 
the state holds all waters, including groundwater, in trust for the 
public.249  The court held that the Great Lakes Preservation Act 
(GLPA), which states that the waters of Michigan are “valuable 
natural resource[s] held in trust” and defines “waters” to include 
groundwater,250 did “not attempt to claim ownership of water,” and 
therefore did not extend Michigan’s public trust doctrine beyond 
 
242 Id. § 1.3(2)(d). 
243 Id. § 1.3(1)(f). 
244 Id. § 4.9(2)(c)(iv), (3)(g) (requiring unanimous regional approval for only intrabasin 
transfers resulting in a net loss of five million gallons per day average or greater over any 
ninety-day period and for all diversions to communities outside of the basin but inside a 
county that is partially within in the basin). 
245 GREAT LAKES WATER RES. COMPACT COMM., supra note 27, at 4. 
246 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 324.32723(1) (2008). 
247 Id. 
248 See Compact, supra note 3, § 1.3(1)(f). 
249 Nestle I, 709 N.W.2d 174, 221 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005). 
250 Id. at 221 n.74.  Plaintiffs also cited the state constitution, MEPA, the Great Lakes 
Submerged Lands Act, and the Inland Lakes and Streams Acts.  Id. 
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navigable surface waters.251  Although the Compact’s trust provision 
is nearly identical to that in the GLPA,252 the court’s decision in 
Nestle I should not frustrate the Compact trust because the Compact 
does not extend Michigan’s public trust doctrine.  Instead, the 
Compact claims state ownership of basin waters by adopting a distinct 
trust that governs Compact decision making.  Unlike the GLPA, the 
Compact does more than “merely recognize the importance of natural 
resources, including water.”253  As discussed above,254 Compact states 
included the public trust provision in the Compact with full 
knowledge of its implications255 and in furtherance of the Compact’s 
purpose of protecting the Great Lakes waters from interests outside 
the region.256  Accordingly, state courts cannot read the public trust 
doctrine out of the Compact. 
Interpreted in the context of the Compact’s purposes, the distinct 
nature of the Compact trust is clear.257  The Compact’s commitment 
to scientifically based decision making258 and its recognition of the 
Great Lakes Basin as an interconnected hydrologic ecosystem259 that 
requires comprehensive protection and cooperative management260 
stands in sharp contrast to the Michigan Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of the purpose of the traditional public trust doctrine as 
providing public access to waters “for use as highways of 
commerce.”261  The Compact’s forward-looking intentions are distinct 
 
251 Nestle I, 709 N.W.2d at 221. 
252 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 324.32702(c) (stating that the “waters of the state are 
valuable public resources held in trust”).  The GLPA defines “waters” to mean “all 
streams, rivers, lakes, connecting channels, and other bodies of water, including 
groundwater, within the Great Lakes basin.”  Id. § 324.32701.  The Compact states: “The 
[w]aters of the [b]asin are precious public natural resources shared and held in trust by the 
[s]tates.”  Compact, supra note 3, § 1.3(1)(a).  The Compact defines “[b]asin [w]ater” to 
mean “the Great Lakes and all streams, rivers, lakes, connecting channels and other bodies 
of water, including tributary groundwater, within the [b]asin.”  Id. § 1.2. 
253 Nestle I, 709 N.W.2d at 221. 
254 See supra notes 46–54 and accompanying text (quoting the legislative history of the 
Compact and the controversy regarding the Compact’s trust language). 
255 See supra notes 49–50 and accompanying text. 
256 See supra notes 51–52 and accompanying text. 
257 See supra notes 240–43 and accompanying text. 
258 Compact, supra note 3, § 1.4(1). 
259 Id. § 1.3(1)(b) (“The [w]aters of the [b]asin are interconnected and part of a single 
hydrologic system[.]”). 
260 Id. §§ 1.3(1)(f), 1.3(2). 
261 Bott v. Comm’n of Natural Res. of Mich., 327 N.W.2d 838, 845 (Mich. 1982) 
(declining to adopt a recreational boating navigation test); see also Nestle I, 709 N.W.2d  
 2009]   The Great Lakes Compact and the Public Trust Doctrine 491 
from the traditional, commercial purpose of Michigan’s public trust 
doctrine.262  Judicial recognition that the Compact trust serves 
different purposes than the traditional public trust doctrine will 
reconcile Compact regulation and Michigan’s common law. 
Michigan courts need not reverse earlier decisions limiting the 
scope of the traditional public trust doctrine in order to uphold the 
Compact trust.  Applying the Compact trust only to Compact 
regulatory decisions leaves Michigan’s traditional public trust 
doctrine intact, applicable in all disputes outside of the Compact’s 
scope.  The limited scope of Michigan’s public trust doctrine cannot 
prevent state implementation of the Compact’s express provisions, 
which extend regulation to diversions and withdrawals of non-
navigable surface waters and groundwater.  State courts must apply 
the Compact trust to all diversions and withdrawals of Great Lakes 
Basin waters, including groundwater and regardless of navigability. 
C.  The Compact Trust in Wisconsin 
In Wisconsin, the Compact requires a state permit for (1) out-of-
basin diversions of Great Lakes water, (2) withdrawals of ten million 
gallons per day or more for in-basin use, or (3) intrabasin transfers of 
one hundred thousand gallons per day or more of basin water between 
Great Lakes watersheds.263  The Compact trust applies to regulation 
of these activities, even if they use waters the state does not 
traditionally hold in trust, such as groundwater and non-navigable 
streams.264  Yet Wisconsin’s implementing legislation maintains that 
nothing in the Compact “may be interpreted to change the application 
of the public trust doctrine . . . or to create any new public trust 
rights.”265  No state can legislate in contradiction to the Compact.266  
Accordingly, either the public trust doctrine clause in Wisconsin’s 
 
174, 220 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005) (“Plaintiffs also contend that . . . . the rule of navigability 
for streams is flexible and evolves with the needs of the public at large and, therefore, that 
this Court is free to modify the test for navigability.  We disagree.”). 
262 See Nestle I, 709 N.W.2d at 220 (declining to adopt a modern test for defining the 
scope of the public trust doctrine). 
263 See supra note 100 and accompanying text. 
264 Muench v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 53 N.W.2d 514, 519 (Wis. 1952) (defining 
Wisconsin’s public trust doctrine by stating, “‘[I]n Wisconsin when it is said that a water 
is navigable, it is merely a different way of saying that it is public.’”) (quoting Adolph 
Kanneberg, Wisconsin Law of Waters, 1946 WIS. L. REV. 345, 349 (1946)). 
265 WIS. STAT. §§ 281.343(1), 281.346(2)(g) (2008). 
266 See supra note 105 and accompanying text. 
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implementing legislation is an ineffective unilateral attempt to amend 
the Compact,267 or the state courts will have to interpret the clause 
consistently with the Compact.  This conflict is pressing in 
Wisconsin, where some of the fastest growing communities lie 
partially outside of the basin268 and are currently preparing diversion 
proposals under the “straddling county” exception.269 
The Compact regulates any diversion of Great Lakes Basin water 
to a community partially outside of the basin.270  Once a diversion 
request triggers Compact regulation, all of the Compact’s provisions 
apply,271 and the state has an obligation to manage the water 
consistently with the Compact trust “for the use, benefit and 
enjoyment of all [its] citizens.”272  The state cannot ignore its 
Compact trustee obligations if the water is not navigable, and 
therefore not within the scope of Wisconsin’s traditional public trust 
doctrine.  Judicial recognition of a distinct Compact trust resolves this 
problem by avoiding any change in the state’s traditional public trust 
doctrine. 
The distinction between the Compact trust and the state’s 
traditional public trust doctrine is not merely semantic.  As discussed 
above,273 the Compact trust is based in the Compact’s purposes and is 
not shackled to the historical navigation nexus that defines 
Wisconsin’s public trust doctrine.274  The Compact trust protects 
public interest in basin waters, defined by the twin aims of the 
Compact: (1) preventing use of Great Lakes water from having 
 
267 Compact, supra note 3, § 9.3 (“Unless otherwise noted in this Compact, any change 
or amendment made to the Compact by any [p]arty in its implementing legislation . . . is 
not considered effective unless concurred in by all [p]arties.”). 
268 GREAT LAKES WATER RES. COMPACT COMM., supra note 27, at 4. 
269 See Don Behm, Waukesha Can Move Forward With Bid for Lake Water, State Tells 
Barrett, JS ONLINE, Oct. 22, 2009, http://www.jsonline.com/news/waukesha/65620842 
.html; see also Barbara Miner, ‘Water is Worth Fighting Over’: Hurrying to Give Water to 
Waukesha Ignores Key Questions, JS ONLINE, Feb. 14, 2009, http://www.jsonline.com/ 
news/opinion/39586067.html. 
270 Compact, supra note 3, § 4.9(1), (3). 
271 Id. §§ 9.3 (“[F]ailure to implement or adhere to any provision [in this Compact] may 
be considered a material breach.”), 4.3 (“No [p]arty may approve a [p]roposal if the [p]arty 
determines that the [p]roposal is inconsistent with this Compact or . . . any implementing 
rules or regulations promulgated thereunder.”). 
272 Id. § 1.3(1)(f). 
273 See supra notes 240–43 and accompanying text. 
274 See supra note 264 and accompanying text. 
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“significant adverse impacts” on the basin ecosystems275 and (2) 
protecting the basin for current and future citizens’ needs through 
cooperative management under science-based principles.276  The 
traditional public trust doctrine remains applicable in Wisconsin’s 
navigable waters, governing activities not controlled by the 
Compact’s limits on diversions and withdrawals.277  Wisconsin may 
of course expand its public trust according to changing public 
needs.278 
The Compact defines a separate trust to serve its purposes, and 
Wisconsin cannot subvert those purposes.279  Applying the Compact 
trust distinctly from the state’s traditional public trust doctrine 
upholds the Compact trust provision, as required by the Compact,280 
without altering the state’s traditional public trust doctrine, as 
required if state courts want to give effect to Wisconsin’s 
implementing legislation.281 
IV 
RECOGNIZING THE COMPACT TRUST 
Michigan and Wisconsin courts recognize the public trust doctrine 
to require the states to protect the public’s paramount interest in 
navigable waters.282  Although the Great Lakes themselves are 
undisputedly navigable, neither state’s public trust doctrine 
encompasses groundwater nor any non-navigable surface waters.283  
In contrast, the Great Lakes Compact recognizes a public trust 
doctrine in all the waters of the Great Lakes Basin, including 
groundwater and surface water.284  This distinct public trust, 
governing applicable diversions and withdrawals within the 
geographic scope of the Compact, is defined by the Compact’s 
 
275 Compact, supra note 3, § 1.3(2)(f). 
276 Id. § 1.3(2)(a), (c), (e). 
277 See supra notes 233–36 and accompanying text. 
278 See Muench v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 53 N.W.2d 514, 520–21 (Wis. 1952) 
(discussing the evolution of the public trust doctrine in Wisconsin). 
279 Compact, supra note 3, § 9.3 (requiring state implementation of and adherence to all 
compact provisions). 
280 Id. 
281 See supra notes 103–06 and accompanying text. 
282 See supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
283 See Craig, supra note 20, at 68–71, 110–13 (summarizing each state’s public trust 
doctrine). 
284 See supra notes 15–17 and accompanying text. 
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purposes and provisions and obligates Michigan and Wisconsin to act 
as trustees for the public when managing Compact water use. 
By interpreting the Great Lakes Compact to create a distinct public 
trust in all Great Lakes Basin waters, Michigan and Wisconsin courts 
can reconcile the Compact’s protection of those waters from 
regionally unsustainable use285 with its preservation of state common 
law,286 harmonize Wisconsin’s implementing legislation with the 
Compact itself,287 and fulfill the Compact’s purpose of preserving the 
integrity of the Great Lakes watersheds and ecosystems for the 
enjoyment of future generations.288 
 
 
 
285 Compact, supra note 3, § 1.3(1)(e), (2)(f). 
286 Id. § 8.1(2). 
287 See supra notes 43–45 and accompanying text. 
288 Compact, supra note 3, § 1.3(1)(f). 
